We consider binary voting systems modeled by a simple game, in which voters vote independently of each other, and the probability distribution over coalitions is known. The Owen's multilinear extension of the simple game is used to improve the use and the computation of three indices defined in this model: the decisiveness index, which is an extension of the Banzhaf index, the success index, which is an extension of the Rae index, and the luckiness index. This approach leads us to prove new properties and inter-relations between these indices. In particular it is proved that the ordinal equivalence between success and decisiveness indices is achieved in any game if and only if the probability distribution is anonymous. In the anonymous case, the egalitarianism of the three indices is compared, and it is also proved that, for these distributions, decisiveness and success indices respect the strength of the seats, whereas luckiness reverses this order.
of obtaining the result one votes for irrespective of whether one's vote is crucial for it or not. Rae (1969) was the first one to take an interest in a measure of success for symmetric simple games, or k-out-of-n games. Dubey and Shapley (1979) suggest that the index can be generalized to any simple game, leading to the definition of the Rae index. However, in simple games there is a linear relationship between the Banzhaf index and the Rae index so that these two measures become almost identical. Other power indices in the literature focus in aspects different from those of success or decisiveness as, for instance, luck (Holler and Packel, 1983) , satisfaction (Brams and Lake, 1978; Van der Brink and Steffen, 2014; Davis et al, 1982) , or inclusiveness (König and Bräuninger, 1998) .
Decisiveness and success notions have been given a broader prospect by Valenciano (2005, 2008) . In their work, additionally to the simple game (N, W), it is assumed that a probability distribution over the coalitions of voters is known. In the present note we assume that, for any voter, we know -or at least have an estimate of -the probability p i of voter i to vote affirmatively for the proposal and that each voter's vote is independent of the others. This information is captured in a vector p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) ∈ (0, 1) n . Clearly, if the vector p is known, then the probability of occurrence of each coalition is known. The model considered in this situation, named assessed simple game in (Carreras, 2004) , is represented by the triple (N, W, p). This model, also known as generalized decision structure, has been studied by several other authors (Berg, 1999; Berg and Marañón, 2001; Dubey and Shapley, 1979; Straffin, 1994; Wilson and Pritchard, 2007) .
In our work we use the MLE of the simple game to study the decisiveness, success and luckiness indices considered by Laruelle and Valenciano in this model. By using this technique we obtain new characterizations of these indices which simplifies their computation. We also analyze their properties and inter-relations, and we compare the rankings they induce on the set of voters, extending to more general voting contexts the comparative study of success and decisiveness done in (Freixas and Pons, 2015) for proper symmetric voting rules under independent and anonymous distributions. Other probabilistic power indices, i.e., power indices in assessed simple games, have been studied by using the MLE (Carreras, 2004 (Carreras, , 2005 Freixas and Pons, 2005, 2008) but, as far as we know, the treatment of success, decisiveness and luckiness indices by using the MLE is novel and allows us to study new properties concerning these three indices: ordinal equivalence, egalitarianism and coherency with the strength of the seats.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce known results directly linked with the context of the work. New expressions of success, decisiveness and luckiness indices, using the MLE, are included in Section 3. In Section 4 we compare the rankings given by the three indices, and in Section 5 the particular case of anonymous probability distributions is studied. The conclusions end the paper in Section 6.
Preliminaries
Assume that a proposal is put to the vote, that it must be either approved or rejected and that each voter can only vote "yes" or "no" (any alternative to voting "yes" is assimilated to voting "no"). A model for such a binary voting scenario is a simple game, that is to say, a pair (N, W), where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denotes the set of voters and W denotes the set of winning coalitions. A coalition is any subset S ⊆ N , and is interpreted as the set of voters which vote "yes" (those in N \S voting "no"). A coalition is winning when its occurrence causes the proposal to be accepted. Subsets of N that are not in W are called losing coalitions. A simple game is defined to be monotonic: if a voter joins a winning coalition then the resulting new coalition is also a winning one. It is assumed that coalitions N and ∅ are respectively winning and losing.
Before the votes are cast it is not possible to know which coalition will emerge, but we assume that an estimation p i is made of the probability that voter i is in it, so that p i is the estimated probability that voter i will vote in favor of the proposal.
Suppose now that the vote of every voter is independent from the vote of the remaining voters. In this case, the probability of coalition S to be formed, i.e., that the voters that vote 'yes' are precisely those of S, is given by
In this way, a probability distribution on the set 2 N of all coalitions is determined by the probability vector p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ), and we will use p to refer interchangeably to both: the probability vector and the probability distribution defined on the set of coalitions. We will denote this model by (N, W, p) and it will be referred to as an assessed simple game. This is the context in which we work in this paper. From now on, the set of voters N = {1, . . . , n} is fixed, so that we will write W instead of (N, W) to denote a simple game, and (W, p) instead of (N, W, p) to denote an assessed simple game.
In an assessed simple game (W, p), the probability of the proposal being accepted is
The function f W is the multilinear extension (MLE) of the simple game W which was introduced by Owen (1972) in the general context of cooperative games. Note that
Using a conditional probability argument, given any voter i ∈ N we can express the probability f W (p) of acceptance of the proposal in terms of p i by: 
Let us recall the notions of power index that are used in this work. Let S N be the set of simple games on N and AS N = S N × (0, 1) n denote the set of assessed simple games on N . A power index h in AS N is a map h : AS N → R n that assigns to every assessed simple game (W, p) a vector h(W, p), with components h i (W, p) for all i ∈ N . Observe that for any p ∈ (0, 1) n this map h induces a power index h p in the set of simple games S N , i.e., a map h
To end this section, we recall some definitions introduced by Laruelle and Valenciano (2005) . For any S ⊆ N , let P (S) denote the probability of S, that is to say, the probability that voters in S are precisely those that vote "yes". In an assessed simple game (W, p) the probability P (S) is given in (1), and the three indices defined in Laruelle and Valenciano (2005) become power indices in the set of assessed simple games. 
ii) Success index:
iii) Luckiness index:
The Banzhaf index B and the Rae index R, defined in simple games, are induced, respectively, by the decisiveness index Φ and by the success index Ω defined in assessed simple games. Specifically, B = Φ p * and R = Ω p * where p * = (0.5, . . . , 0.5). The following theorem was proved in (Laruelle et al, 2006) .
for any i ∈ N and for any simple game W
Theorem 2.2 tells us that the relationship between Banzhaf and Rae indices
verified for any W, cannot be generally extended to any assessed simple game (W, p).
On the other hand, it is obvious that for any (W, p) we have
and, by defining L = Λ p * , with p * = (0.5, . . . , 0.5), we obtain Barry's equation (Barry, 1980a,b) , verified for any simple game W:
We conclude this preliminary section of well-known results by noticing that decisiveness of a voter only depends on the other voters' behavior, not on his/her own, since voter i's decisiveness can be written as
3 The three indices expressed in terms of the MLE 
Proof: (1), (5), and (10) it follows
On the other hand, from (2):
b) From (6) in Definition 2.1 it is clear that success can be written
because, for any vector p, we have:
but, if p i = 0 then the first and the third addends are zero and the factor 1 − p i does not appear in the remaining addends.
c) Taking into account (8) and applying parts a) and b), we get the result.
We remark that Theorem 2.2 can easily be proved by using the expressions of success and decisiveness established in Proposition 3.1.
Comparing rankings
The main purpose of this section is to study the ordinal equivalence of decisiveness, success and luckiness indices in assessed simple games. A similar study was done in (Freixas et al, 2012) for the Shapley, Banzhaf and Johnston indices in the context of simple games. (W, p) . ii) g and h are ordinally opposite in (W, p) if for all i, j ∈ N : 
for all i, j ∈ N , and we say that g p and h p are ordinally opposite in W.
A clear consequence of (7) is that the Banzhaf and Rae indices are ordinally equivalent in any simple game. Moreover, by combining equations (7) and (9) we deduce that, for any simple game W, it is:
Hence, the index L is ordinally opposite to the Banzhaf and Rae indices in any simple game W. These relations among rankings verified when p = p ⋆ can not be generally extended to other probability distributions. The following lemma will be used to compare the rankings given by decisiveness, success and luckiness indices for p ̸ = (0.5, . . . , 0.5). The notation f W (x i , y j , p) is used to denote the value of f W on a vector whose components are the same as those of p except components i and j whose values are, respectively, x and y. The value of f W (x i , y j , p) is the conditional probability of the proposal being accepted if i votes "yes" with probability x and j votes "yes" with probability y.
Lemma 4.3 Let (W, p) be an assessed simple game and i, j be different voters in
where:
Proof:
Expressions a) and b) are obtained by using (3) in Proposition 3.1. Part c) is deduced from them by using (8). N and p ∈ (0, 1) n . Then, a)If p i = p j then, for any game W,
Theorem 4.4 Let i, j be different voters in
c)If p i ̸ = p j and there is a voter k ̸ = i, j with p k ̸ = 0.5, then we can find a game W such that
e)If n ≥ 3 and p i ̸ = p j then we can find a game W such that
have the same sign.
Proof:
a) If p i = p j = p then, for any game W, using lemma 4.3 we have,
The fact that 0 < p < 1 leads to the conclusion.
b)
If N = {i, j} then there are only four possible games, and we see that in all of them the statement is true.
Assume, without loss of generality, that p i < p j , and let k ̸ = i, j be such that p k ̸ = 0.5.
• If p k < 0.5 then consider the game W with f
and the statement is proved.
e) Let W be the unanimity game, for which f
Thus, since p ∈ (0, 1) n , the three differences have the same sign.
As a consequence of part a) in Theorem 4.4, for a probability distribution with coincident components, i.e., p = (p, . . . , p), success and decisiveness indices are ordinally equivalent, and ordinally opposite to the luckiness index, in (W, p) for any game W. In the next section we study in more detail the rankings given by the three indices in this kind of probability distributions.
Anonymous probability distributions Definition 5.1 A probability distribution
p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) is anonymous if p 1 = · · · = p n , i.e.,
all voters have the same probability of voting 'yes'. In this case, the probability of forming a coalition S ⊆ N depends only on the number of voters s in S, and is given by
Since in this case we have p = (p, p, . . . , p) , the corresponding assessed simple game will be denoted by (W, p).
The next proposition shows that, for more than two voters, anonymous probability distributions are the only ones for which the indices induced in simple games by success and decisiveness are ordinally equivalent in any game, and also the only ones for which the index induced by luckiness is ordinally opposite to both of them in any game. (W, p) , and, from Theorem 4.4-e), we can find a game W for which
As a consequence of Proposition 5.2 we see that, for anonymous probability distributions, the opposite effect that luckiness show compared with decisiveness has no additive effect on success.
Two power indices can rank voters in the same (or opposite) way but taking extremely different numerical values. In what follows we compare the range of values of the three considered indices for anonymous probability distributions.
Definition 5.3 Let g and h be two power indices in AS
We can also say that h is less egalitarian than g in (W, p) .
if g and h are ordinally opposite in (W, p) we say that g is an inverse k-reduction of h in (W, p).
Remark 5.4 In any assessed simple game (W, p):
• If g is a k-reduction of h for some k then g is more egalitarian than h.
• If g 1 is a k 1 -reduction of h and g 2 is a k 2 -reduction of h, then k 1 < k 2 implies that g 1 is more egalitarian than g 2 .
•
Definition 5.7 Weak desirability relation Let W be a simple game and i, j ∈ N .
where This relation is weaker than the well-known desirability relation (Isbell, 1958) in the sense that if a voter i is at least as desirable as a voter j then i W j (Diffo Lambo and Moulen, 2002) , and the class of weakly complete games includes the class of complete games, i.e. the games for which the desirability relation is complete.
In (Freixas, 2010 ) the following proposition was proved.
Proposition 5.8 Let W be a simple game, i, j ∈ N and p = (p, . . . , p) with p ∈ (0, 1). Then,
Thus, from Lemma 4.3 and Proposition 5.8 the next corollary follows.
Corollary 5.9 Let W be a simple game, i, j ∈ N and p = (p, . . . , p) with p ∈ (0, 1). Then,
, which is equivalent to:
Thus, for anonymous probability distributions the strategic part of the model (W, p), which is captured by the vector p = (p, . . . , p) , is neutral since all voters have a common probability. Therefore, what really matters is the strength of the seats that they occupy. Next result follows from the previous corollary.
Corollary 5.10 Let W be a weakly complete simple game and p = (p, . . . , p) with p ∈ (0, 1). Then, the following items are equivalent:
As a consequence of this corollary, the decisiveness and the success indices rank the voters in the same way as the weak desirability relation in any weakly complete game W, for any p ∈ (0, 1), while luckiness rank them in an opposite way. That is, the less significant is the seat of a voter the more lucky the voter is.
Conclusions
In this paper we use the multilinear extension of simple games to study three power indices in assessed simple games. An assessed simple game (N, W, p) is defined by a simple game (N, W), which model a voting scenario, and a vector p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) ∈ (0, 1) n . Each component p i is the assumed a priori probability that voter i ∈ N votes in favor of a proposal, independently of each other. The multilinear extension turns out to be a useful tool to compute the indices of decisiveness, success and luckiness in assessed simple games, and to establish some new properties covering the issues of ordinal equivalence and egalitarianism.
In particular, the rankings among voters given by the success index Ω, the decisiveness index Φ and the luckiness index Λ in (N, W, p) , are compared by using the multilinear extension f W of the game (N, W) . In Theorem 4.4 it is proved that if two voters i and j have the same probability of voting 'yes', i.e., p i = p j in the vector p, then decisiveness and success indices rank them in the same way in (N, W, p) for any simple game W, while luckiness rank them in the reverse order. It is also proved that, for n > 2, if p i ̸ = p j we can always find games for which this relationship between rankings is not maintained. From these results we prove that success and decisiveness are ordinally equivalent in (N, W, p) for any W if and only if p is anonymous. And it is also proved that anonymous probability distributions are the only ones for which success (decisiveness) is ordinally opposite to luckiness in any game.
In the anonymous case, the egalitarianism of the three studied indices is compared and we prove that, for any pair of these indices, one of them is a k-reduction of the other for some k. It is also proved that the common ranking given by success and decisiveness coincides with the ranking given by the weak desirability relation in weakly complete simple games, that is to say, the success or the decisiveness of voters depend only on their position in the game. Instead, luckiness give a ranking of voters opposite to that given by the weak desirability relation.
Weakly complete games may not be the only kind of games for which all anonymous and independent probability distributions induce the same ranking among the voters. An open question to be studied is to characterize the simple games with this property.
